Pettit’s Dilemma: Legitimacy and the Problem of Contestation in Rousseau’s “The Social Contract”

Abstract

This is a critical analysis of Philip Pettit’s interpretation and reception of Jean Jacques Rousseau’s “The Social Contract” for Pettit’s neorepublican project. The author addresses the essay “Rousseau’s Dilemma” in which, Pettit argues that the principles of Rousseau’s theories of sovereignty and legitimacy would not allow for contestation to occur in Rousseau’s republic. While Pettit believes that Rousseau’s theory of legitimacy upholds the republican conception of freedom as nondomination, by preventing private domination in individuals’ relations with each other, he stipulates that Rousseau’s theory of absolute sovereignty does not protect against public domination. Specifically, it prevents citizens from stepping outside of their roles in the legislative assembly and contesting those laws that they have enacted in a majoritarian voting process. He determines that because the sovereign is absolute, contestation is impermissible. The author argues that Pettit conflates the logic of absolutist government with the directives of the general will. She finds that by conceiving of the general will as an active principle and as the sole source of reason for the conduct of the body politic that it grounds both political obligation and the ability for citizens to contest sovereign law in the event of a contradiction of sovereignty.

Full Article

Mc Nulty